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CULTURAL DIVERSITY IN CUSTODY DISPUTES 
By: 
Frederick H. Zemans 
Osgoode Hall Law School of 
York University 
Downsview, Ontario 
Blackstone, in his Commentaries, says: 
11 The last duty of pa rents to their children is that 
of giving them an education suitable to their situa-
tion in life; a duty pointed out by reason and of 
far the greatest importance of any. For as Puffendorf 
very well observes 'it is not easy to imagine or allow 
that a parent has conferred any considerable benefit 
upon his child by bringing him into the world, if he 
afterwards entirely neglects his cul tu re and education, 
and suffers him to grow up like a mere beast, to lead 
a life useless to others and shameful to himself'. Yet 
the municipal laws of most countries seem to be defect-
ive on this point by not constraining the parent to 
bestow proper education upon his children. Perhaps 
they thought it punishment enough to leave the parent 
who neglects the instruction of his family to labour 
under those griefs and inconveniences which his family 
so unin~tructed will be sure to bring upon him. Our 
laws, though their defects in this particular cannot 
be denied, have in one instance made a wise provision 
for breeding up the rising generation; since the poor 
and laborious part of the community when past the age 
of nurture a're · taken out of the hands of their parents 
by the statutes for apprenticing poor children; and 
are placed out by the public in such a manner as may 
render their abilities in their several stations of the 
greatest advantage to the commonwealth. The rich, 
indeed, are left at their option whether they will breed 
up their children to be ornaments or disgraces to their 
family. 11 l 
The Commentaries give us a perspective of the expectations of 
medieval English society and its laws with respect to child rearing and 
the transmission of community values. Canada has inherited the common 
laws• values as articulated by Blackstone and has attempted to integrate 
them into its very different society. 
Heterogeneous and pluralistic, Canada's society contains numer-
ous cultural groups, each of which maintain distinct and independent tradi-
tions as well as the various national and religious institutions required 
to support these traditions. 2 
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Our Confederation was conceived in the nineteenth century 
within a context of biculturalism and has been expanded during the 
twentieth century to include multi-culturalism. In describing the Con-
federation debates, Ramsay Cook wrHes that: 
... there can be no doubt that the Fathers, French 
and English, were intent upon the establishment of 
a "new nationality". Speaker after speaker in the 
Confederation debates emphasized this point. But it 
seems equally true that none of the Fathers intended 
or expected that the new nation would be culturally 
and linguistically homogeneous. It was to be a poli-
tical nation in which cultyral differences were 
accepted as une chose donnee. 3 
French and English Canadians have maintained, and perhaps strength-
ened, their independent cultural traditions since these debates. Peoples 
from numerous cultures have immigrated to Canada without losing their cult-
ural traditions in the acculturation process of adapting to a new country. 4 
Compounded with the empirical fact of our multicultural society 
is the phenomenon of the continuing growing concern with cultural and famil-
ial roots. People of every culture are rediscovering their heritage and 
reasserting their traditions. This greater consciousness of heritage and, 
consequently, of Canada 1 s cultural diversity has manifested itself at the 
national level. The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism per-
ceived that Canadian society could achieve 11 unity in diversity 11 by integra-
ting its heterogeneous elements into a harmonious system. 5 In 1971, the 
Prime Minister, Pierre Elliot Trudeau, reasserted the views of the Bilingu-
alism and Biculturalism Commission by initiating a new multicultural policy: 
National unity if it is to mean anything in the deeply 
personal sense, must be founded on confidence in one's 
own individual identity; out of this can grow respect 
for that of others and a willingness to share ideas, 
attitudes and assumptions. A vigorous policy of multi-
culturalism will help create this initial confidence. 
It can form the base of a society which is based on fair 
play for all. , 6 
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This focus upon multiculturalism and cultural diversity is 
not by accident nor is it a passing fad. It is a consciousness that has 
fundamental credence. In what is a seemingly paradoxical existence, man 
is an individual who desires to live in a social world; a fine balance is 
maintained between our being individuals and our being members of a 
larger social group. In a society where increased mechanization and mass 
media reduce man to the common social denominator of anonymity, the 
balance swings heavily against individualism. Reasserting our cultural 
diversity is one way in which the b~lance is maintained; by emphasizing 
cultural differences the citizen is able to distinguish himself and per-
ceive himself as an individual against the backdrop of Canadian society. 
Our concern for cultural diver?ity and identity is as necessary as the 
empirical fact of our individualism. Cultural diversity is a reality with-
in Canadian society. It is a reality for which there is a legitimate and 
a necessary basis for consideration by all institutions including the 
Canadian judiciary. 
Within the context of family law, judges must deal with cultural 
diversity in a number of situations. For example, a court may be asked to 
determine whether a Native Indian child is in need of protection and 
should be removed from the parents. · To determine if the child is in need 
of protection, should the judge apply criteria for removal which reflect 
the values of his culture or should the criteria reflect the cultural values 
of the Native community? If the Native child is apprehended, should he be 
removed from the Native community or be temporarily placed with a relative 
or friend? Should the court go the additional step and allow the child to 
be adopted by non-Native parents? In other instances, judges may have to 
determine matters of custody or access in a situation where each parent 
offers a distinct cultural or religious environment for the child's upbring-
ing. How can the judiciary choose which cultural environment would be best 
for the child without injecting its own cultural values into the determina-
tion? 
What is needed and what must be elucidated are a set of guiding 
principles which enable the judiciary to make consistent and predictable 
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custodial determinations in as many situations as possible in which 
diverse cultural values come into contact and conflict. Ideally, such 
guidelines should be equally applicable to child welfare proceedings and 
adoptions, as well as to custody or access determinations. In addition, 
if such a set of principles are to be applicable cross-culturally, then 
they must attempt to avoid an emphasis of the culture of the Canadian 
majority or for that matter of one segment of Canadian society. A set of 
principles to be used within any cultural context has no legitimacy if 
premised upon the values of one culture only. This goal sets a unique 
challenge to the Canadian judiciary which has traditionally been composed 
of upper-middle class men from similar cultural backgrounds. 
Such a set of principles may be no more than general guidelines. 
It would be difficult to prescribe specific, exhaustive criteria for deal-
ing with family law issues which involve cultural conflict. The essence 
of any culture is its own particular formulation of the family institution. 
There is no a priori concept of the family; it is defined by those practices 
of the particular culture w~th which one is dealing. For example, in one 
culture the family may be perceived as a fairly small, nuclear unit while 
in other cultures there may be an extended concept of the family whereby 
grandparents, aunts, uncles and other relatives or perhaps the whole 
community are perceived as the family. With cultural values built into the 
concept of the family itself, it is therefore not surprising that no clearly 
defined criteria can be described to enable the legislature or the judiciary 
to deal with cultural diversity in either internal family disputes or dis-
putes between the family and the state. 
In dealing with cultural diversity the judiciary has at its dis-
posal a threshold principle of state intervention. At some minimum level, 
where the child 1 s physical or mental well being is threatened with irrever-
sible damage, it is the state's and therefore the judiciary's role to 
intervene. Although various cultures tolerate different degrees of physical 
and mental punishment this is only a reason for setting the threshold of 
intervention at a high level and not a reason for excluding state interven-
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tion. 7 State intervention at some level is grounded in the non-cultural 
premise that if we are to live in a social world - if we are to have a 
viable community - society must set minimal standards which protect the 
lives of its individual members. 
Beyond this threshold principle, another fundamental principle 
or guiding notion is the recognition or consciousness that the judiciary 
has few absolute values at its disposal when dealing with family law 
matters within a context of cultural diversity. The bench must struggle 
with the realization that it is working within the realm of the relative 
where nothing is self-evident. The task of the court is to recognize and 
to identify the various cultural values with which it is confronted and 
to strike a balance between them. Consciousness of this recognition and 
balancing process was dealt with most explicitly by the United States 
Supreme Court in .W1sconsin v. Yoder (1972), 406 U.S. 205. 
Wisconsin v. Yoder is a landmark case with implications for 
common law jurisdictions which extend well beyond the American border. It 
acknowledges and pays deference to cultural values other than those pre-
scribed and administered by the state. The respondents were members of the 
Old Order Amish religion who were convicted for violating Wisconsin's 
compulsory school attendance law. The statute required children to attend 
a sanctioned form of schooling until the age of 16. The respondents were 
removing their children from school after the completion of the eighth grade. 
The issue for judicial determination was whether the state's interest in 
educating its youth superseded the constitutional protection given to 
individuals to exercise their religion freely. Based upon considerable 
expert evidence, the court, with Chief Justice Burger delivering the 
majority opinion, found that the Amish religion necessarily encompassed a 
way of life which would be threatened if children continued their schooling 
within the public system after grade eight. The values that the children 
would be exposed to during their formative adolescent years would not be 
compatible with the way of life of the Old Order Amish community. Compul-
sory education therefore threatened the Amish religion. The court stated 
its findings as follows: 
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The conclusion is inescapable that secondary 
schooling, by exposing Amish children to worldly 
influences in terms of attitudes, goals, and 
values contrary to beliefs, and by substantially 
interfering with the religious development of the 
Amish child and his integration into the way of 
life of the Amish faith community at the crucial 
adolescent stage of development, contravenes the 
basic religious tenets and practice of the Amish 
faith, both as to the parent and the child. 
(at p. 218) 
Having found that the Amish religion would be jeopardized by 
exposing Amish children to higher education, the court had to decide 
whether the state's interest in educating its youth still superseded the 
protection of the Amish religion. The court was highly conscious of the 
balancing exercise it had to undertake: 
Thus, a State's interest in universal education, 
however highly we rank it, is not totally free 
from a balancing process when it impinges on 
fundamental rights and interests, such as those 
specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause 
of the First Amendment, and the traditional interest 
of parents with respect to the religious upbringing 
of their children so long as they, in the words of 
Pierce, 11 prepare [them] for additional obligations 11 • 
(at p. 214) 
The court found that even though the state had a legitimate interest in 
enforcing its education regulations, the Amish community had succeeded in 
providing the necessary education for its children. Indeed, the expert 
evidence went so far as to show that the Amish~ 
... system of learning-by-doing was an 11 ideal system11 
of education in terms of preparing Amish children for 
life as adults in the Amish community, and that ur 
would be inclined to say they do a better job in this 
than most of the rest of us do, . 
(at p. 223) 
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The court concluded that the state's interest in education did not super-
sede the protection afforded to the Amish religion. 
Wisconsin v. Yoder is significant because it deals explicitly 
with the careful balancing of diverse cultural values or concerns and 
because it is highly conscious of the fact that there are no absolutes 
when dealing with such cultural issues. Mr. Justice Burger stated that: 
There can be no assumption that today 1 s majority is 
11 right 11 and the Amish and others like them are 11 wrong 11 • 
A way of life that is odd or even erratic but inter-
feres with no rights or interests of others is not to 
be condemned because it is different. 
(at pp. 223-224) 
The court cautioned that it must perform its role with the utmost of care: 
This should suggest that courts must move with great 
circumspection in performing the sensitive and delicate 
task of weighing a State 1 s legitimate social concern 
when faced with religious claims for exemption from 
generally applicable educational requirements. 
(at p. 235) 
Wisconsin v. Yoder must be considered from the perspective of the 
time and the setting that the decision was written. Firstly, it is an 
American decision dealing with explicit constitutional protections of reli-
gious freedom. The court stressed that the Amish way of life is both an 
outgrowth and aspect of the Amish religion. Wisconsin v. Yoder is a case in 
which religious freedom was at issue and it is unlikely that such protection 
would be afforded to secular interests. In addition, the court found that 
the Amish were providing adequate education, if not better education, for 
their children. Nor was this a case involving a confl~ct of constrasting 
values. The court considered the expert testimony which indicated that the 
Amish way of life exemplified many of the fundamental values of American 
society: 
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~Jhatever their i di osyncrasi es as seen by the majority, 
this record strongly shows that the Amish community 
has been a highly successful social unit within our 
society, even if apart from the conventional 11 main-
stream11. Its members are productive and very 1 aw-
abi ding members of society; they reject public welfare 
in any of its usual modern forms. (at p. 222) 
Indeed, the Amish communities singularly parallel and 
reflect many of the virtues of Jefferson 1 s ideal of 
the 11 sturdy yoeman 11 who would form the basis of what 
he considered as the ideal of a democratic society. 
Even their idiosyncratic separateness exemplifies the 
diversity we profess to admire and encourage. 
(at pp. 225-226) 
Wisconsin v. Yoder was therefore a good, and perhaps easy, case 
for the U.S. Supreme Court to show deference to the values of another 
culture. It was also a case which allowed the court to reiterate its 
commitment to family life, hard work and agrarian values at a time in 
American history when the Vietnam war and the sixties were threatening a 
cultural upheaval which was discrediting traditional values. It is not 
clear that the same result would have been obtained had there been more 
cultural divergence. Nevertheless, Wisconsin v. Yoder stands for the 
principle of judicial consciousness of cultural diversity wherein the 
judiciary both acknowledges and balances various cultural interests. 
Mr. Justice William Douglas' partial dissent in Wisconsin v. 
Yoder should be mentioned because of its recognition of the rights of a 
third party to the dispute - the Amish children. Douglas agreed with the 
majority that Amish values were in opposition to the education requirements 
of schooling beyond grade eight. However, he noted that the majority 1 s 
analysis treated the dispute as being one between Amish parents and the 
state and that at no point were the rights of the Amish children considered. 
Douglas argued that children are 11 persons 11 within the meaning of the 
American Bill of Rights and cited precedents where children had their con-
stitutional interests protected. Even though the Amish children were not 
parties to the action, Douglas argued that because of their constitutional 
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rights, the religious exemption for Amish parents could not be granted 
unless the views and the rights of the Amish children were also consid-
ered. Douglas puts his position as follows: 
It is the student's judgment, not his parents', 
that is essential if we are to give full meaning 
to what we have said about the Bill of Rights and 
of the right of students to be masters of their 
own destiny. If he is harnessed to the Amish way 
of life by those in authority over him and if his 
education is truncated, his entire life may be 
stunted and deformed. The child, therefore, should 
be given an opportunity to be heard before the 
State gives the exemption which we honor today. (at pp. 245-246) 
Douglas therefore directed that the decision be reserved until the various 
views of the Amish children were elicited. If the Amish children did 
desire to attend high school then 11 the state may well be able to override 
the parents' religiously motivated objections". (at p. 242) Douglas also 
considered that the majority's emphasis on the law and order record of the 
Amish people was irrelevant. He argued that any religious group is en-
titled to protection under the First Amendment. 
In Canada, cases dealing with education and religion are sparse 
and none deal with the issues as directly or thoroughly as Wisconsin v. Yoder. 
In Regina v. Wiebe, [1978] 3 W.W.R. 36, Oliver Prov.J. dealt 
with a factual situation similar to Wisconsin v. Yoder. The accused was a 
Mennonite charged with contravening the provisions of the School Act. 
Members of the Mennonite community had withdrawn their children from the 
public school system on the basis that the system was teaching their children 
values which were not in accordance with their religious beliefs. The court 
found that the Mennonite religion was closely linked to education and the 
education of Mennonite children was given protection under the freedom of 
religion clause of the Alberta Bill of Rights. The Department of Education 
Act was rendered inoperative by the Alberta Bill of Rights and the accused 
was found not guilty. The decision is a reflective discussion of the 
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principles encountered in Wisconsin v. Yoder and it recognized that: 
.•. there exists a plethora of evidence not only 
of deep religious convictions sincerely held by 
the accused concerning the manner in which his 
child should be educated, but also of an unshake-
able determination to educate his child in 
accordance with his religious beliefs. The law 
of Alberta would, without f i rst permitting him 
re course to the courts, penal i ze him fo r this on 
the basis of absolute l iability . (at p. 62) 
The earlier case of Chabot v. Lamorandiere (1958), 12 D.L.R. 
(2d) 796 (Que.Q.B., C.A.) also skirted the issue but was more specifically 
a statement of religious rights in the context of education. There, the 
court held that a member of a religious sect may compel acceptance of his/ 
her children into the publicly funded schools and may also insist that 
they Qe exempted from religious exercises. Pratte J. stated at 803 that 
there is a right to instruct in one's own religion but not a right to 
impose it. In this case, the only school available was a Roman Catholic 
school - no dissident or Protestant school existed in the municipality, 
as allowed by the legislation. Rinfret J., dissenting, said at 827 that 
the parents had three alternative under the legislation: to have their 
children attend the majority (i.e., in this case Roman Catholic) school 
and follow the curriculum, to declare they were dissidents and set up 
their own school (this parent was apparently the only Jehovah's Witness), 
or to have their children attend a school in a neighbouring municipality. 
The onus is on the parent to show he has no other alternative available. 
In Perepolkin v. Superintendent of Child Welfare (1957), 11 
D.L.R. (2d) 417 (B.C.C.A.), Sidney Smith J.A. found that the Doukhabours 
did not constitute a religious sect in the true legal sense and thus there 
was no infringement of religious freedom by requiring the children to attend 
public schools. As with the Amish in Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Doukhabours 
here believed that the public schools were exposing their children to 
11 materialistic influences and ideals 11 • 
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Limited litigation has left the Canadian case law devoid of 
depth in analysis of these issues. None of the decisions provide the 
degree of recognition of diverse and conflicting cultural values that 
was evident in the United States Supreme Court's decision in Wisconsin 
v. Yoder. 
Outside the education context, the issue of cultural diversity 
frequently arises within child welfare cases where the courts must deter-
mine whether to find a child of another culture in need of protection. 
Within the Native Indian population of Canada the problem of child 
apprehension has been acute. 8 Historically, the Native Indian family 
structure was self-supporting and had its own remedial systems before the 
imposition of non-Native values upon the Native community. Douglas Sanders 
described the effect of non-Native values on the Native community in his 
report to The Law Reform Commission of Canada: 
In the traditional and tribal way, there are no 
unwanted children. Children are loved and cherished 
and their parents place the utmost significance in 
their children's lives because it means the continua-
tion of themselves, of their tribal ways, and of the 
living earth. 
There are no orphans either because in the event 
that a child's parents die, someone, a brother or 
sister of the deceased or grandparents or other kin 
will always take that child as their own. There is 
always someone and some place for an Indian child to 
go. 
It has only been recently that there have been home-
1 ess children: it can be said that this had been a 
direct result of the Christianization of the Indian 
people. When Indian people have been forced to 
acculturate, to have to go away to school, when 
missionaries imposed the Christian religion upon them, 
then it was that Indian communities began to fragment. 
As a result, Indian families which had been close and 
intact began to fal1 apart a~d relationships were not 
as close as before .... 
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True, there are some cases of serious neglect of 
children by Indian parents. The situation of Indians 
in North America has led to drastic social disorgan-
ization in many cases, and often the children are the 
first to suffer the effects. But often .Indian children 
are taken into foster care through courts simply 
because social workers feel they will give the children 
a better opportunity off the reservation. Some social 
workers dominate Indian communities so much that the 
Indians no longer feel it worthwhile to protest the 
frequent removal of children from homes.... 9 
With the growing consciousness of cultural preservation within 
the Native community, programmes have been initiated to keep Native children 
within the Native culture when it is deemed necessary to remove the child 
from his family or when the child is in a position to be adopted. 
These new programmes, however, need to be complemented by an 
awareness at the judicial level of the diverse needs and values of the 
Native communities. It is still the court, composed in most instances 
of a single judge, which will decide when children are in need of pro-
tection and should be removed from the h0me. It is still the Canadian 
courts, with few, if any, Native judges, which will oversee all family law 
matters within the Native community. What principles, then, can a court 
rely upon when deciding whether to remove the child from the Native family? 
A preliminary principle is cautionary in nature. In their 
recent book, Before the Best Interests of the Child, Goldstein, Freud and 
Solnit argue that the state should only intervene in custodial and child 
welfare determinations in a limited number of instances. lO There is a 
strong onus upon the courts to show that threshold societal concerns are 
being violated and that the state can provide a better alternative for the 
child. Part of the rationale for this limited judicial role lies in the 
fact that the state is 11 too crude an instrument to become an adequate sub-
stitute for flesh and blood parents 11 • 11 If the state must be cautious about 
the apprehension of children from its own culture then it must be more 
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cautious about the apprehension of children from other cultures. If the 
state is a rough and crude device for supervising the complexity of 
family relationships then it is even less adequate in supervising and 
accomodating the family relationship within another cultural context. 
The courts must therefore exercise caution in determining whether to 
remove the child from the Native family. 
Beyond this cautionary principle it is difficult to ascertain 
non-culturally biased criteria for the apprehension of children. That 
there are no absolutes was the lesson of Wisconsin v. Yoder. It follows, 
then, that if a child is to be removed from his Native family, he should 
be removed after considering the family situation in the context of the 
particular Native community, rather than the standards of child care rec-
ognized by North American middle class society. Adopting this approach 
requires a principle of identification to be utilized. Courts must seek 
to define and elucidate the standards of the community with which they are 
dealing. Courts must demand that the necessary evidence be presented. An 
example of this approach is the recent decision of Provincial Judge Moxley 
in Re E.C.D.M. (1980), 17 R.F.L. (2d) 274 (Sask.Prov.Ct.). The respondent 
mother was a 24 year old single Indian parent of Cree ancestry with a two 
year old child. The mother lived in Northern Saskatchewan, had no perman-
ent employment, suffered from alcoholism, and had no permanent residence. 
The child had previously been found to be in need of protection and had 
been committed to the temporary care of the Minister of Family Services. 
The Department subsequently applied for a permanent order of wardship for 
the two year old Ghild. The mother opposed the application and the matter 
came on for trial. Judge Moxley adopted an identification principle in 
defining the standard of state apprehension of children: 
Furthermore, while there is a minimal parental standard 
for all society, a secondary standard must be established 
for parents of the age of the parent in question and for 
the type of community in which the parent resides. A 
teen-aged parent cannot live up to the standard expected 
for a middle-aged parent. Similarly, different standards 
- 14 -
of parenting apply to parents of Cree ancestry who reside 
in a small rural community in Northern Saskatchewan than 
would apply to white middle-class parents living, for 
example, in Regina. What is an acceptable standard for 
the former might be unacceptable to the latter. 
(at p. 275) 
The court went on to describe the cultural and community features of Cree 
and Chipewyan societies. Noteworthy among these features was the presence 
of an extended family concept rather than a nuclear family concept as well 
as an ethic of non-intervention which was extended to the disciplining of 
children. 12 The court granted a permanent order committing the child to 
the care of the Minister. The court found that living in crowded conditions 
in a house owned by a relative, unemployment, lack of skills and problems 
with alcohol were common factors in the area and were not a significant 
departure from the community standard. Presumably, a permanent order would 
not be made on these factors above. However, the court focused upon a 
number of factors including the mother's lack of interest in her children, 
her inability to look after her own most basic needs such as her failure to 
acquire glasses or apply for social assistance payments, and substantial 
problems with the mother's proposed living arrangements, and concluded that 
the child was in need of protection. Judge Moxley believed that there was 
little or no hope of improvement in the immediate future and therefore 
ordered permanent commitment of the child to the care of the Minister. The 
Saskatchewan court in this case adopted criteria for state intervention and 
removal of the child which attempted to take into consideration the cultural 
standards and living conditions of the society in which the child was born 
and lived. Thus a cautionary approach and utilization of a principle of 
identification are two guiding notions with which the court can deal with 
the apprehension of children from other cultures~ especially Canada's diverse 
· and multi-faceted Native communities. 
The issue of cultural diversity presents a different problem 
within the context of custody and access determinations and in the context 
of cultural adoption. The difficult task for the courts is to choose between 
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cultures; the court must decide in which cultural environment the child 
should be raised. Should the child be brought up within the Catholic, 
rural, French Canadian environment of the mother, or will the child be 
better off within the more liberal, English, cosmopolitan lifestyle of 
the father? 13 In another typical situation, should the child be in the 
custody of the parent who professes little, if any, religious commitment 
or should custody be given to the parent who is religiously active perhaps 
to the degree of denying the child important medical services? 14 Within 
the adoption context, should the court allow a child of one culture or 
religion to be adopted by parents who have a different cultural lifestyle 
or religion?15 What principles can be utilized to enable a judge to make 
the difficult choice between cultures without the judge being influenced 
by his own culturally rooted assumptions of what cultural upbringing is best 
for a child? 
The analysis in Before the Best Interests of the Child is of 
some assistance in seeking an analytical framework for determining custody 
disputes. The authors argue that stability and continuity in the child's 
lifestyle are crucial to the child's complete and normal development. It 
is this need for continuity which in part forms the basis of the authors' 
strong assertion for parental autonomy in the raising of children. 16 But 
a child's lifestyle is a function of the cultural environment in which the 
child develops; a child does not grow up in a cultural vacuum. A child has, 
in addition to a set of recognizable individuals who surround him, a set 
of habits, beliefs and perceptions which all reflect the particular cultural 
climate in which that child is developing. It would seem, therefore, that 
if stability and continuity are crucial to the healthy development of a child 
then not only are the parental tie and parental autonomy important but 
cultural autonomy or the child's tie to his cultural, social or religious 
environment will be equally crucial in the development of the child. The 
task for the court, then, is to both ascertain and understand that cultural 
environment in which children before the court are developing. With all 
other factors equal, the custodial determination should be significantly 
-16 -
influenced by the cultural, religious or social orientation of the child. 
This recommendation would fly in the face of such famous custody cases as 
Painter v. Bannister (1966), 140 N.W. (2d) 152, where the Iowa Supreme 
Court chose the cultural values of the grandparents over the non-traditional 
west coast lifestyle of the father. The writer recognizes that all other 
factors are never equal and that a child's cultural lifestyle will only be 
one of a multitude of factors before a court in a custody hearing. Never-
theless, the child's link to his culture and background is a guiding 
principle that must be given careful consideration and not overlooked in 
attempting to ascertain the best interest of the child. 
Support for the principle of cultural continuity can be found in 
some recent Canadian custody cases. In Gauci v. Gauci (1972), 9 R.F.L. 189 
(Ont.S.C.), Lacourcierre J. focused upon the change in the cultural environ-
ment that the child would be subjected to if moved from the interim custody 
of his father to the care and control of his mother: 
The main question in the present action is not one of 
moral, intellectual or financial advantages, but whether 
Brian Gauci should continue to develop according to the 
cultural and spiritual tradition of his father's closely-
knit family or whether he should be uprooted and taken 
to a new environment in an effort to upgrade the quality 
of his life. I am satisfied that the preponderance of 
evidence points to the future happiness and welfare of 
the child continuing to be served in the environment of 
the Gauci family, with its cultural and religious 
traditions. (at p. 193) 
In the case of Hayre v. Hayre (1973), 11 R.F.L. 188 (B.C.S.C.) 
the court was squarely confronted with the issue of having to choose between 
diverse cultural upbringings. The father adhered to the Sikh culture and 
religion while the mother was a Protestant of Canadian-Irish extraction. 
Mcintyre J. granted custody to the father and in doing so he focused upon 
the preservation of the child's personal sense of religious and cultural 
identity. 
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This boy is a Sikh; he will always be regarded as a 
Sikh in this country. It will be well for him to be 
brought up as a Sikh, to preserve his existing know-
ledge of the Punjabi language, to be schooled in the 
religion and traditions of the people with whom he 
will always be associated. It will, in my view, be 
possible for him to find a secure personal identity 
only in the Sikh community. It is the only identity 
our society will permit him. Let him, then, be a 
Sikh and be proud of the tradition and accomplishments 
of a proud and worthy race. No matter how much she 
loves him, his mother cannot accomplish this. I 
direct that custody of the boy be given to his father. 
(at p. 188) 
Utilizing a principle of cultural continuity req~ires the imple-
mentation of a two-step process. The court must first acknowledge that 
between competing cultures, religions or lifestyles, neither is prima facie 
to be preferred as the setting for the child. This analysis is often 
complicated because of lack of knowledge by the judiciary of minority life-
styles as well as expressed preferences for the custodial parent or the 
tender years doctrine. Secondly, the court must invoke the principle of 
cultural continuity and evaluate in which cultural environment it is appropri-
ate for the child to be raised. Such a two-stage approach was employed in 
McQuillan v. McQuillan and Salomaa (1975), 21 R.F.L. 324 (Ont.C.A.). The 
dispute for custody was between the 4-1/2 year old child's natural mother 
and maternal grandmother. The grandmother had cared for the child much of 
its life while the mother had spent much of her life wandering and search-
ing for a fulfilling lifestyle. At the time of the trial the mother 
belonged to the Hare Krishna movement and was attempting to teach its 
principles to the child. O'Leary J. awarded custody to the grandmother but 
not before setting out two helpful guiding notions. The court recognized 
that it was not its function to pass judgment on the principles of the 
Krishna movement. It stated that: 
The court obviously has no right to dictate to parents 
the religious philosophy they choose for themselves and 
their children, let alone the right to deny custody to 
a parent because of his or her religious beliefs. 
(at p. 330) 
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In addition, the court considered the stability and continuity in the 
child's upbringing and found that life with the mother within the Krishna 
movement would not be in the child's interest: 
I have no confidence that she will remain in the 
movement and, even if she does, that she has the 
maturity to raise her son in the Kirshna movement 
and give him the stimulation, opportunities and 
stability necessary for his development. 
(at p. 330) 
The focus was therefore on stability and the mother's inability to provide 
it rather than a focus on the lifestyle exemplified by the Krishna movement 
per se. 
Some Canadian cases within the child welfare context have also 
exhibited a concern for cultural continuity. In Re P.S.B. (1978), 15 
R.F.L. (2d) 199 (Ont.Prov.Ct., [Family Division]), the child was found to 
be in need of protection and a temporary wardship order was made. The 
child had been raised in the Jewish faith a~d, being fourteen years of 
age, expressed a preference to be placed in a Jewish home. Judge Moore found: 
Mareover, the evidence disclosed that, in the past, 
she has been made to feel inferior and inadequate 
because of her Jewish faith. If this court were to 
deny a finding of Judaism, we would be perpetuating 
and reinforcing this sense of inferiority and the 
child would continue to be ashamed and embarrassed 
because of her religion. (at p. 202) 
Judge Moore ordered that she be placed in the care of a Children's Aid 
Society and in a Jewish home. The same concern for cultural continuity was 
echoed in Mooswa et al. v. Minister of Social Services for the Province of 
Saskatchewan (1976), 30 R.F.L. 101 (Sask.Q.B.), where the mother appealed a 
Magistrate's order committing the child to the permanent care of the 
Minister. Johnson J. stated that: 
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What is basic in this kind of problem is the right 
and need of the child to be raised, if possible, by 
its natural mother in its natural environment and 
its own cultural surroundings. Although the standard 
of living provided by that mother and the care given 
to the child may not be considered acceptable by 
others, nevertheless if those ~tandards conform to 
those considered average in the particular class or 
group to which the parent(s) belong, the court ought 
not to interfere. · 
(at p. 102) 
Based on the mother 1 s success in overcoming her alcoholism and her efforts 
to improve her life, the court awarded custody to the mother where the child 
would 11 be given the opportunity to be raised by her natural mother amongst 
people of her own race and culture 11 • (at p. 102) 
Other Canadian cases demonstrate that there is yet no clear 
understanding of a consistent and predictable formula for dealing with 
competing cultural interests. Our courts have tended to choose between 
conflicting cultural values without clarifying or analysing the basis for 
their decisions. For instance, in Robichaud v. Robichaud (1978), 6 R.F.L. 
(2d) 232 (Sask.Q.B.), the custody dispute was between the mother and father. 
The mother belonged to a sect wherein the children were separated from 
parents and raised within an institutional setting. The two children of 
the litigants had been living within this institutional scheme. The father, 
who was found to be an exemplary parent, did not belong to the sect. In 
awarding custody to the father, MacPherson J. preferred the one-to-one, 
parent-child relationship over the institutional format of child rearing: 
In matters of child welfare I have always regarded an 
institution, however good, as something to be used in 
an emergency only. In a choice between a competent 
and loving parent, and an institution, however good, 
I must, and I think our law must, prefer the parent. 
(at p. 234) 
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While the court's preference may have sound theoretical basis, that justi-
fication is lacking. Why is the natural parent to be preferred to the 
institution? Does the answer lie within an historical prejudice or is it 
best for the child to have an ongoing connection with the natural parent? 
The Canadian family is being subjected to increased strains between the 
concept of natural parenting and the concept of institutional parenting. 
The gulf between parents and children in a cosmopolitan, technological 
society is widening and some form of institutional care is often required 
to fill the gap. Hopefully we share a sophisticated analysis and discussion 
of these issues. 
A similar problem is evident in the recent case of Elbaz v. 
Elbaz (1980), 114 D.L.R. (3d) 116 (Ont.H.C.J.). The custody dispute was 
between the father who was born in Morocco of Orthodox Jewish parents and 
the mother who is Canadian of a French, Roman Catholic background. The 
wife converted to Judaism before the marriage but was not as devout as her 
husband. Pennell J. awarded custody to the father and stated that: 
The children have been raised by the parties in the 
orthodox Jewish way of life. In my judgment, it is 
in their best interests that they continue to have 
that upbringing. (at p. 127) 
Once again the decision may have merit but it is totally devoid of analysis. 
Why is it better that the children continue to have an orthodox Jewish 
upbringing? Does the court's decision rest on the continuing stability of 
the relationship of the children with the father, or is the court seriously 
considering the cultural and religious background of the parents? The 
decision examines the cultural issue relating to custody in a rather 
cursory fashion and then attempts to construct an access regime which is both 
unmanageable and unenforceable: 
(1) For the first three week-ends each month from 
Saturday 1 :00 p.m. to Monday 8:00 p.m.; two week-
nights each month from 4:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m., 
namely, on Wednesday of the week before and the 
Wednesday after the week-end when the children are 
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in the care of the husband, except when the 
Jewish High Holidays, Rosh Hashanah, Yorn Kippur, 
Succoth, Passover and Shavuot fall on such days, 
then on such days the husband shall have the care 
of the children but an equivalent period of time 
in each case shall be given to the wife in civic 
holidays .... 
(6) The wife, whenever the children are in her 
care, shall ensure that the children eat kosher 
food and observe as far as reasonably possible 
the Shabbat, subject to the right to travel with 
the children on Shabbat with tickets purchased in 
advance. I use the words 11 as far as reasonably 
possible 11 bearing in mind unusual situations. To 
i 11 ustrate: 1 ast summe'r the wife took the chi 1 dren 
on a vacation to Prince Edward Island. It happened, 
as I am advised, that there was no synagogue there. 
To the orthodox, the history of the Jewish people is 
not because they contemplate God from an intellectual 
point of view but because of observance. The wife 
should therefore avoid exposing the children to 
influences that are in conflict with orthodox Jewish 
spiritual values. (at pp. 128-129) 
In other Canadian cases, courts have only utilized the first 
step of what is necessarily a two-step process. Recognizing that no one 
culture or religion is the touchstone of cultural propriety is not enough 
to make a proper custodial determination; the courts must go the additional 
step and determine the focus of stability and continuity in the child's 
life. For example, in Benoit v. Benoit (1972), 10 R.F.L. 282 (Ont.Co.Ct.), 
Beardall Co.Ct.J. considered the validity of an access order which prohibited 
the father, a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses, from discussing religion 
with the children. The court found that the restriction was not proper, 
basing its decision on the premise that the court is in no position to 
decide which is the 11 right 11 religion: 
I do not think that any court has the right to decide 
that one form of religious instruction and belief is 
the true religion and that some other one is false, or 
to say that one is better than the other, but that all 
men are free to select their own religious belief and 
to practice it without interference by someone else 
thrusting upon them a religion that they do not care 
for. (at p. 284) 
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By lifting the restriction on access the court recognized the limited 
role it has as an arbiter of family disputes. Where children are in-
volved the court's mandate is to determine the best interests of the 
child which is primarily a custody determination. This issue was well 
stated by Litsky Juvenile Ct.J. in Re M.(L. and K.) (1978), 6 R.F.L. (2d) 
297 (Alta.Juv.Ct.), a case in which the children were apprehended from 
parents who belonged to a cult society: 
Freedom of religion is well protected in the province 
of Alberta through its Alberta Bill of Rights, 1972 
(Alta.), c.l, which is almost identical to s.l of the 
Canadian Bill of Rights, R.S.C. 1970, App. III. 
Freedom does not, however, include absolute freedom, 
especially when it comes to the rights of children, 
their best interests or welfare. Certainly the religious 
concern of each person is a personal matter, but the 
concern for children's upbringing is society's major 
concern, and it has to be predicated by the court's 
interpretation. The Alpha and Omega Order has a right 
to an untrammelled religious belief, but it steps over 
its bounds when it creates· an atmosphere which is not 
conducive to allowing a child to reach his potential on 
an individual basis. It cannot be stated too often 
that it is the child's interests that are at stake, and 
it should be remembered by members of the legal pro-
fession that the rule in neglect cases must be utilized 
as a protection of the child and not necessarily as a 
bulwark for the rights of parenthood. (at p. 321) 
The concern for the child's interests is the key. Cultural continuity 
and stability are critical factors of those best interests. To act in the 
child's best interests the court must take the active second step and 
identify or protect the source of stability in the child's life. 
Conclusion 
The author has attempted to discuss some of the difficult issues 
facing a culturally diverse nation and which confront the courts in child 
welfare, child• custody and access, and in public education situations. 
Intervention by the courts in custody and child welfare matters is severely 
circumscribed by the authors of Before the Best Interests of the Child. 
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Critics of the Goldstein, Freud and Solnit thesis have expressed concern 
that they emphasize family integrity and parental autonomy to the exclu-
sion of defining the rights of children. 17 Similarly, this author does 
not wish to ignore the importance of the rights of children and specifi-
cally the need for Canadian courts to attempt to determine what is in 
their best interest. Canadian courts must begin to deal with the diffi-
cult issues raised by both the majority and Mr. Justice Douglas in 
Wisconsin v. Yoder. As Katheryn D. Katz writes in her review of Before 
the Best Interests of the Child: 
To suggest that the family integrity is a value of such 
overriding significance that no other interest should be 
considered is a simplistic resolution to parent-child 
conflicts. There is a crucial issue raised by this book 
that is not addressed: in a pluralistic society, how do 
we foster diversity, plurality and individualism without 
doing violence to children's interests in autonomy, free-
dom and dignity? Coercive state intervention has in 
many instances led to unwarranted and harmful intrusions 
into family privacy and integrity. The latitude afforded 
the state must be curbed. However, a rigid doctrine of 
deference to parental authority will redound to the 
detriment of children. 18 
As discussed above, it is impossible to set a closed set of 
criteria by which judges could make determinations in situations involving 
a conflict of cultural values. The concept of the family is amorphous 
and culturally grounded thus precluding any a-cultural treatment of the 
concept and similarly preventing any set of a-cultural values that attach 
to the concept of the family from being defined. In addition, a set of 
theoretical criteria could not be applied blindly without the benefit of 
observing those ~ part~es who make a claim in the family dispute; family 
law determinations involve complex factors which cannot be listed as static 
indicia to be applied by the court. The principles discussed above are, at 
best, principles of approach or attitude. 
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The thematic or guiding principle is one of recognition or 
consciousness of the diverse cultural interests which will often be present 
in a family law dispute. Dealing with these divergent cultural values is 
a legitimate and necessary function for the judiciary to undertake. Judges 
must not mistake their own culturally biased values as a priori touchstones 
of cultural sanctity. Rather, the role of the judiciary must be to balance 
the competing cultural values that arise. 
The second guiding principle is a principle of identification. 
Judges must define, and demand the necessary evidence to do so, the cultural 
backgrounds of the parties to the dispute. Only with this information will 
the court be able to do the kind of delicate balancing of cultural values 
that was done in Wisconsin v. Yoder and only with this information will the 
court be able to identify the standards of a community for the purposes of 
child apprehension disputes. 
The third principle is best described as a principle of deference. 
A strong onus must be satisfied before the courts can interfere with the 
autonomy of parental rights and the continuity of the child's cultural life-
style. Maintaining the cultural status guo is not the only factor in a 
child custody determination, but it must be recognized as a relevant and 
important factor. 
Faced every day with the fact that Canada is culturally diverse, 
Canadian courts are becoming attuned to the reality that the parties before 
them will often seek to assert and preserve values other than those held 
by the judiciary. If this diversity is to be maintained - if Canadian 
society is to flourish with the synthesis of ideas and innovations that 
cultural diversity fosters - then Canada's judiciary must be willing to deal 
with cultural diversity as a legitimate issue. The judiciary must remain 
cognizant of the fact that 11 a prime function of the law is to prevent one 
person's truth •.. from becoming another person's tyranny 11 • 19 
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